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An Exploratory Study 
Victor R. Fuchs 
This paper reports the results of an exploratory effort in a new area- 
the relationship between  intertemporal choice,  health behavior,  and 
health status. Intertemporal choice (or time preference) is, of course, a 
subject much discussed by economists and psychologists. (See Maital and 
Maitall978.) There is also a large literature on individual behavior (e.g., 
cigarette smoking, diet, exercise) and health status. This paper, however, 
seems to  be the first to attempt to bring these subjects together and to test 
empirically for possible interrelations. 
In the first section of the paper I briefly review some of  the considera- 
tions that suggest that an investigation of  time preference might throw 
light on health behavior and health status. These include empirical stud- 
ies of the relation between schooling and health, epidemiological inves- 
tigations of the health effects of cigarette smoking, diet, exercise, and the 
like,  and theoretical issues concerning investment  in  human capital, 
imperfections in capital markets, and optimizing behavior. 
The second section considers the critical problem of the measurement 
of  time preference and reviews some recent efforts by other investigators 
to  measure time preference in contexts other than health. I then describe 
a pilot questionnaire given to 500 men and women and present the results 
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of  correlation and regression analyses of  their replies. The paper con- 
cludes with a discussion of questions raised by this exploratory research. 
Background 
Empirical considerations 
Cross-sectional studies of  the  determinants of  health  status in  the 
United States usually report a strong association between health and 
years of  schooling. This result typically appears regardless of  whether 
health is measured objectively (e.g., mortality rates) or subjectively 
(e.g., self-evaluation),  and is equally robust in studies of  differences 
across groups (e.g., states or cities) or across individuals (e.g., household 
survey data). Simple correlations between health and years of schooling 
are usually  significant in both  the statistical and the practical sense. 
Furthermore,  the relation  remains  strong  after  controlling for other 
variables such as income. 
Probably the most thorough investigation of this relationship has been 
carried out by Michael Grossman in “The Correlation .between Health 
and Schooling” (1975). This study of  middle-aged men is particularly 
notable for two reasons. 
First, a statistically significant effect of  schooling on health remains 
after controlling for a large number of  other variables, including family 
background, health status in high school, income, job satisfaction, and 
scores on physical and mental tests taken by the men when they were in 
their early 20s. 
Second, each of the men had at least a high school diploma; the mean 
level of  schooling was over fifteen years. Grossman’s finding that the 
favorable effects of  additional schooling persist even at high levels of 
schooling is in sharp contrast to the relation between income and health, 
which is positive at low levels of income but seems to be much weaker or 
nonexistent at average or high levels (Auster, Leveson, and Sarachek 
1969). 
While the relationship between schooling and health seems well estab- 
lished, the mechanisms through which schooling affects health are less 
clear. Grossman has interpreted the empirical results as support for a 
household  production  function  model;  additional years of  schooling 
make the individual a more efficient producer of  health. This efficiency 
may  arise through wiser use of  medical care or, what is more likely, 
through differences in cigarette smoking, diet, and other elements of “life 
style. ” 
The view that “the greatest potential for improving the health of  the 
American people. . .  is to be found in what people do and don’t do to and 
for themselves” (Fuchs, 1967) has gained widespread acceptance in re- 95  Time Preference and Health 
cent years as the result of numerous studies by epidemiologists and social 
scientists interested in health.’ These studies report significant differ- 
ences in health status and in life expectancy associated with such factors 
as cigarette smoking, diet, and exercise. Not only is a statistical correla- 
tion well established, but in many instances there is some understanding 
of  the causal mechanisms as well, e.g., the role of diet and exercise in the 
prevention of  atherosclerosis. What is not understood at all well is the 
cause of  individual variation in health-related behavior. 
From  an economic point  of  view  many of  these behaviors have a 
common characteristic-they  involve trade-offs between current costs 
and future benefits. The costs may be purely psychic, such as the loss of 
pleasure from passing up a rich dessert or a cigarette. They may involve 
time, such as jogging, or they may involve other costs including financial 
and nonfinancial resources. The expected benefits typically take the form 
of  reductions in the probability of  morbidity and mortality from one or 
more diseases sometime in the future. 
Theoretical considerations 
The acceptance of  a current cost for a future benefit constitutes an 
investment. Becker’s development of the theory of investment in human 
capital (Becker 1964) and Grossman’s application of this theory spe- 
cifically to health (Grossman 1972) provide a convenient framework for 
thinking about these health behaviors. Suppose individuals differ in their 
willingness or ability to undertake investments, i.e., they have different 
time preferences. Such differences might help to explain variations in 
cigarette smoking, diet, and the like. Furthermore, this approach sug- 
gests possible links with the health-schooling relationship that has been 
found by so many investigators. 
There are at least two ways that individual variation in time preference 
could explain the correlation between schooling and health.* First, sup- 
pose that differences in time preference are established early in life, are 
relatively stable, and do affect subsequent behavior.’ These differences 
might be due to differences in the education or income of  parents, the 
stability of the family, the values associated with different religions, or to 
other background characteristics. Given variation in time preference, it 
would not be surprising to observe that individuals with low rates of time 
discount would invest in many years of schooling and would also invest in 
health-enhancing  activities. According to this view  schooling has no 
direct effect on health; the observed correlation is due to both schooling 
and health as depending upon time preference. 
A second possibility (the two explanations are not mutually exclusive) 
is that schooling actually affects time preference; those with more school- 
ing are more willing to invest at a lower rate of  ret~rn.~  Thus more 
schooling could  result  in better  health  by  increasing investments in 96  Victor R. Fuchs 
health. The empirical portion  of  this paper, based on a single cross- 
section survey, cannot distinguish between these two hypotheses, but we 
can test for possible relations between schooling and time preference. 
Empirical investigation of  time preference through survey questions 
designed to elicit marginal rates of  time discount depends critically on 
capital markets being “imperfect.” If capital markets were perfect (i.e., if 
individuals could borrow and lend without limit at a single market rate of 
interest) marginal rates would be equal for all regardless of time prefer- 
ence. Differences across individuals in time preference might still result 
in differences in nontradeable health-related activities, but these would 
not be predictable from the replies to interest rate questions. However, if 
capital markets are not perfect (an assumption of this paper), individuals 
may well have different rates of interest at the margin, and these may be 
related to health behavior and health status. 
Let us imagine a two-period world.  Suppose utility in  each period 
depends upon consumption of goods (G). Utility in the first period also is 
a function of  some activity C1 (for simplicity assumed to be free with 
respect to G)  which affects health (and therefore utility) in period two. 
For example C1  might be cigarette smoking: 
u1=  U1(GI,CJ 
U2  = U2(G2,H2)  where H2  = H(Cl). 
A wealth compensated increase in the rate of  interest (r)  will, ceteris 
paribus, alter the allocation of  wealth between GI and G2.  But if  the 
marginal utility of  C1 depends on the quantity of  G1 (and the marginal 
utility of H2  depends on the quantity of G2),  the change in r will also affect 
C1  (and H2).  If  GI and C1 (and G2  and H2)  are substitutes, an increase in r 
will lead to an increase in C1 and a decrease in H2.  If  the relationship is 
complementary (which seems less plausible to me), the reverse would be 
true. 
It should be emphasized that (given imperfect capital markets) differ- 
ences across individuals in marginal rates of  interest can be the result of 
differences in underlying preference functions (indifference curves) or 
differences in opportunities to borrow and lend.5  In general, it will not be 
possible to distinguish between these sources empirically, although con- 
trolling for family income (as a proxy for “opportunities”) may move the 
analysis somewhat closer to a focus on preference functions per se. 
Because time preference is probably only one of many factors affecting 
the demand for cigarettes, jogging, or other health-related behaviors, we 
can hardly expect perfect correlation among these activities. Differences 
in time preference across individuals, however, should result in  some 
positive correlations among these behaviors. 97  Time Preference and Health 
Measurement of Time Preference 
In recent  years  there have been several attempts to measure time 
preference through household survey techniques. The objectives of  the 
investigators  have varied  greatly, but the general approach has been 
similar: the respondent is confronted with a hypothetical situation involv- 
ing different sums of  money at different points in time and is asked to 
express a preference which will implicitly reveal a rate of time discount. 
Thomas and Ward (1979) 
Psychologists  Ewart A. C.  Thomas and Wanda  E. Ward were in- 
terested in relations between time preference and various psychological 
measures of  temporal orientation6 and measures of  optimism or pessi- 
mism. They were also interested in possible effects of time preference on 
saving and spending behavior.  Their  sample  consisted  of  63 college 
students  who were asked 24 open-ended  time preference questions of the 
following type: 
If  offered $100 now or X dollars in six months, what would be the 
smallest amount of money (X dollars) you would accept rather than the 
immediately available $loo? 
Some questions gave the future amount and asked the respondent  to 
choose a current value; others gave both amounts and asked for the time 
period that would make them commensurate. Still others were formu- 
lated as payments rather than as receipts, and some were expressed in 
terms of  goods rather than dollar amounts. 
Implicit diskount rates were found to be negatively  correlated with 
future time orientation and positively correlated with “big spending.” 
The group results were considered satisfactory, but the measurement of 
time preference was “disappointing” to the authors because of the “high 
instability of  parameter estimates for individual subjects.” 
West (SRI) (1978) 
Economists involved in the Seattle-Denver income maintenance ex- 
periment were interested in time preference because the bias introduced 
by the finite length of the experiment (compared to a national program of 
indefinite life) would var‘y depending upon the household’s rate of time 
discount (Metcalf 1974). The families in the experiment (more than 1,500 
in each city) were asked a large number and variety of  time preference 
questions. Some  were open-ended,  similar to those of Thomas and Ward. 
Some were “cascades” of  the following type: 
Suppose you had a choice between a cash bonus of  $100 today and $200 
a year from now; which would you choose? 98  Victor R.  Fuchs 
If  the respondent  chooses  $200, the question is repeated, with  $175 
substituted for $200, and so on until the respondent chooses $100. Some 
cascade questions go up instead of down; some involve payments rather 
than receipts; and some involve different time periods. 
The mean interest rates implicit in the replies of  these low income 
respondents were typically quite high, but the correlation between ques- 
tions was typically low (r= about .1 or .2). The author, Richard W. 
West, expressed some concern that “the measures are not reliable”  (p. 
23). 
Maital and Maital (1978) 
A  paper by  an economist  and  a  psychologist,  Shlomo Maital and 
Sharona Maital, reviews some of  the economic and psychological litera- 
ture on time preference and reports the results of  a survey of  515 Israeli 
adults. The Maitals’ focus is on the role of  time preference in the in- 
tergenerational transmission of  income inequality. They asked one cas- 
cade question involving choice between a sum of  money now and higher 
sums one  year from now. A similar question in which gift certificates for a 
week’s shopping at a supermarket  were substituted for money was asked 
in an attempt to measure the real as opposed to the nominal implicit rate 
of  interest. 
The implicit  interest  rate was  negatively  correlated  with  years of 
schooling (r = -  .08) and with a dummy variable which took a value of 1 
if the subject and the subject’s father were born in Israel (r = -  .12). The 
nominal rate was negatively correlated with income (r  = -  .14), but the 
real rate was not. The authors concluded that the ability to  defer gratifica- 
tion is part of the process of socialization and that “after adolescence the 
propensity to delay gratification is quite stable” (p. 192). This may be 
correct, but it is not clear that the conclusion follows from their results. 
Thaler (1979) 
In a questionnaire administered’ to approximately 75 college students, 
Richard  Thaler posed  a large number of  open-ended  money choices 
primarily to learn how the implicit interest rate varies with the amount of 
money involved, the time period, the starting point of  the comparison, 
and whether the choice involves receipt or payment. He found that the 
implicit rate was lower the larger the amount of money and the longer the 
time period. Also, choices involving two points both in the future typi- 
cally invoked a smaller implicit interest rate than choices involving the 
present versus the future. He concluded that there is a “psychicjked 
cost” to waiting, as well as a cost that varies with amount and time. 
I included a few questions on health status in the Thaler questionnaire 
and found a significant negative correlation between health and median 99  Time Preference and Health 
implicit interest rate across individuals. This result led me to undertake 
the larger pilot survey described in the next section. 
The Pilot Survey 
In November 1979, Stephen and Ann Cole conducted a survey measur- 
ing time preference, health status, and health behavior as well as a large 
number of  family background  and current socioeconomic variables.s 
Telephone interviews approximately twenty minutes in length were con- 
ducted with 508 individuals living in Nassau and Suffolk Counties (on 
Long Island just east of  New York City). Respondents were selected 
through a random sample of telephone  number^;^ interviews were com- 
pleted with 58% of  the eligible respondents. The characteristics of  the 
respondents conformed closely to census data for those two counties, but 
the possibility of selection bias remains, especially with respect to some of 
the family background variables. 
The sample was restricted to individuals aged 25-64,  and interviewers 
were instructed to obtain an approximately equal distribution between 
female and male respondents. The respondents differ from a national 
sample with respect to religion (55% Catholic and 17% Jewish), race (3% 
black), and schooling (about one year above the national average). They 
are also somewhat more affluent and in slightly better health. Allowing 
for the predominantly suburban middle-class character of  the two coun- 
ties, the distributions of  replies on the health, health behavior, family 
background,  and  socioeconomic variables  conform  closely  to those 
obtained in national surveys. 
The principal approach to the measurement of  time preference was 
through a series of six questions asking the respondent to choose between 
a sum of money now and a larger sum at a specific point in the future,” 
e.g.,  “Would  you choose $1,500 now  or $4,000 in five years?”  The 
amount and the time period varied, as did the interest rate implicit in each 
question. The lowest implicit rate was 10.1% per annum (continuously 
compounded); the highest was 51.1%. This dichotomous choice type of 
question was used because it was deemed simpler for the respondent than 
the open-ended or cascade type questions discussed previously.” 
In addition to the implicit interest rate series of questions, a cascade 
type question with an explicit interest rate (beginning at 6% and rising to 
50%) was asked. The survey also included four attitudinal questions, 
e.g., “DO  you agree or disagree with this statement: It makes more sense 
to spend your money now rather than save it for the future.” Also, each 
respondent was asked to choose an expected rate of change of prices for 
the coming year. The final time preference questions dealt with the 
respondent’s use of  credit during car purchases or through unpaid bal- 
ances on bank credit cards. 100  Victor R. Fuchs 
Empirical Results 
One of  the purposes of  the pilot survey was to determine whether 
respondents would, in a brief telephone interview, give sensible answers 
to hypothetical money choice questions when the interest rates implicit in 
the questions are far from transparent. The data presented in Table 3.1 
suggest that many respondents do  give sensible replies; some do not. The 
six implicit interest rate questions ask the respondent to choose between 
taking a smaller prize now or waiting for a larger prize. A priori we expect 
the fraction of  respondents taking the prize now  to diminish as the 
implicit interest rate rises. Table 3.1 shows that this did occur. For the 
sample as a whole, 76% chose “now” for the question with an implicit 
interest rate of  10.1% per annum; only 33%  did so when the implicit 
interest rate was 51.1%. 
Not only do the group results conform to a priori expectations, but 
almost two-thirds of  the respondents gave replies which were internally 
consistent for each individual. A set of replies was defined as consistent if 
the respondent never answered “now” to a question with an implicit 
interest rate that was higher than the rate in another question to which the 
answer was ‘‘wait.’r12  The last three columns of Table 3.1  show results for 
the sample divided into three groups: those with consistent answers, 
those whose answers would be consistent if  one reply were reversed 
(about one-fourth of  the sample), and those respondents whose replies 
require two or three reversals in order to achieve consistency (about 10% 
of the sample).I3  The relation between the fraction taking the prize now 
and the implicit interest rate is much weaker for those respondents with 
inconsistent  answers  and  much  stronger  for  those  with  consistent 
answers. Most of  the results reported here are based on analyses limited 
to those respondents with consistent replies. 
Table 3.2 presents the results of regressions in which each question to 
each individual is treated as an observation. When the regressions are run 
OLS, the dependent variable is dichotomous, taking a value of  1 if  the 
Table 3.1  Mean Probability of Taking Prize Now 
Implicit compound  All  Number of  inconsistent answers 
respondents  1  2 or 3  Question  interest rate 
number  (% per annum)  (N=504)  (N=329)  (N=  124)  (N=51) 
30  10.1  .76  .78  .75  .61 
32  15.7  .61  .66  .56  .34 
28  19.6  .58  .59  .60  .41 
29  30.5  .52  .52  .48  .61 
33  40.2  .34  .35  .28  .41 
31  51.1  .33  .25  .37  .71 101  Time Preference and Health 
Table 3.2  Regressions of Probability of Taking Prize Now 
on Interest Rate Variables 
Number of inconsistent answers  All 
respondents  0  1  2 or 3 
N 
R2 
Intercept 
Question compound 
implicit interest 
rate (% per annum) 
Question simple 
implicit interest 
rate (% per annum) 
Respondent explicit 
interest rate 
(% per annum) 
2952 
,106 
,733 
(  ,022) 
(.0012) 
-  .0073** 
[ -  .0071] 
-  .0017** 
(.OO06) 
[ -  .0020] 
(.000S) 
.0054** 
[  .OO64] 
1956 
,158 
,783 
(  ,026) 
-  .0111** 
(.0014) 
[ -  .0126] 
-  ,0008 
(.0007) 
[ -  .0007] 
.0068** 
(.0009) 
[  .OO90] 
719  277 
,082  ,026 
.733  ,414 
(  ,046)  (.074) 
-  .0037  .0106* 
(  ,0024)  (.0040) 
[ -  ,00341  [.0135] 
(.0011)  (.OO19) 
[ -  ,00531 
.0020  ,0010 
(.OO19)  (.0025) 
-  .0032**  -  .0042* 
[ -  ,00371 
[ ,00191  [.0010] 
Notes:  Regressions based  on person-question  observations.  The OLS regression  coef- 
ficients are shown first with their standard errors in parentheses below. The marginal effects 
(at mean probability) from the logistic regressions are in brackets. 
*p  <  .05 
**p  <  .01 
reply is “now” and 0 if  it is “wait.” The right side variables are the 
compound  interest rate implicit in each question, the simple implicit 
interest rate, and the individual’s  explicit interest rate given in reply to the 
cascade question mentioned  in  the previous section. We see that the 
probability that a given individual will reply “now” to a given question 
falls sharply as the interest rate implicit in the question rises, and rises 
rapidly as the individual’s explicit interest rate rises. These results hold 
for the entire sample and are particularly strong for those respondents 
classified as consistent, but do not hold for the other respondents. Logis- 
tic regressions estimated by a maximum likelihood procedure give similar 
results when evaluated at the mean probability of  taking “now.” (See 
marginal effects in brackets.) 
The contrast  between  the compound  interest  rate and  the simple 
interest rate coefficients, depending upon the consistency class, suggests 
one possible reason why  some respondents give inconsistent re~1ies.l~ 
The two interest rates are, of  course, highly correlated, but not perfectly 
so. Those giving consistent replies seem to have been influenced by the 
implicit compound rate, while those with the most inconsistent replies 
seem to have been influenced primarily by the simple rate. We also see 
that there is a close connection between the explicit rate and the probabil- 102  Victor R. Fuchs 
ity of  choosing “now” for the consistent individuals, but not for those 
whose replies to the implicit rate questions were inconsistent. 
Inasmuch as these results are based on replies to only six questions, 
they can only be suggestive, not definitive. (It would be desirable to see if 
the distinction between the compound and simple interest rate holds up 
in a survey based on a large number of  questions.) For this sample, this 
distinction gives stronger results than do regressions based on Thaler’s 
hypotheses about the effects of length of time or amount of money on the 
willingness to wait. 
Table 3.3 resports the results of  regressions similar to those in Table 
3.2, but designed to measure the effects of  individual characteristics on 
the probability  of  the individual choosing “now”  in  response  to the 
implicit interest rate questions. The regressions are limited to respon- 
dents with consistent replies and are run separately for females and males 
because preliminary analysis revealed significant interaction effects for 
some variables. A brief discussion of  the additional variables follows: 
AGE: Respondents placed themselves in one of four age cate- 
gories: 25-34,  3544,45-54, or 55-64. The midpoint of 
each category was used to construct a continuous vari- 
able. There was no a priori expectation for this variable. 
Maital and Maital had found a positive correlation be- 
tween age and the “real” interest rate (r = .lo), but no 
relation with the nominal rate. 
PARED: Parents’ education is the mean of the years of schooling 
of  the respondent’s mother and father. The separate 
schooling variables are highly correlated, and do not 
yield any significant information when included separ- 
ately.  A  priori  I  expected  a negative coefficient for 
PARED, at least prior to inclusion of  other variables 
that are also affected by PARED, e.g., the respondent’s 
own years of  schooling. 
LIVPAR: This is  a dummy variable taking  a value of  1 if  the 
respondent lived with both parents until age 16;  0 other- 
wise. Some of the psychological literature suggests that 
this coefficient should be negative, i.e.,  should work 
much the same way as PARED. 
CATH, JEW: These are dummy variables taking a value of  1 if  the 
respondent is Catholic (or Jewish), and 0 if  Protestant or 
other. 
EXINFL:  Expected inflation is a continuous variable derived from 
the respondent’s reply to the question about expected 
price change during the coming year. A positive coef- 
ficient is expected when the implicit interest rate is held Table 3.3  Regressions of Probability of Taking Prize Now on Socioeconomic Variables 
Question compound 
implicit interest 
rate (% per annum) 
AGE 
PARED 
LIVPAR 
CATH 
JEW 
EXINFL 
s12YRS 
216YRS 
ADJINC 
Intercept 
RZ 
-  .011** 
.002 
-  .003 
.066 
-  ,046 
-  .222** 
.015** 
.647 
,155 
-  .011** 
,001 
,007 
.091* 
-  ,057 
-  .164** 
.013** 
.116** 
-  ,134'; 
.566 
,186 
-  .011** 
,002 
.013** 
.105** 
-  .078* 
-  .137** 
.013** 
.087* 
-  .138** 
-  .016** 
,648 
,210 
[ -  .014] 
~0031 
[  ,0161 
[.  1381 
[ -  .089] 
[ -  .197] 
[.017] 
[.111] 
[ -  .161] 
[ -  .019] 
-  .013** 
-  .003** 
-  .031** 
.061 
-  ,033 
-  ,064 
.004 
1.257 
.176 
-  .013** 
-  ,002" 
-  .029** 
.049 
-  .017 
-  .081 
.004 
.129*  * 
.164** 
1.115 
.192 
-  .013** 
-  .002* 
-  .030** 
.058 
-  .018 
-  .086 
.005 
.142*  * 
.161** 
.004 
1.063 
.194 
[ -  ,0161 
[ -  .037] 
[ -  ,0021 
[-.0@31 
[ -  ,1101 
[.065] 
[.0031 
[.  1701 
[.218] 
[.0041 
Note: Regressions based on person-question observations. 
The coefficients from the OLS regressions are in columns 1-3. 
The marginal effects (at mean probability) from the logistic regressions are in column 3L. 
'Consistent respondents only. 
*p <  .05 
**p  <  .01 104  Victor R. Fuchs 
constant. At any given nominal rate, the respondent 
should be less willing to wait if  prices are expected to rise 
rapidly because the implicit “real”  rate of  interest  is 
lower. 
2YRS  These are dummy variables for the respondent’s own 
and  years of schooling. The omitted class is those with 13 to 
6YRS:  15  years. A positive coefficient is expected for 512YRS, 
and a negative one for 216YRS, for reasons discussed in 
the first section of  this paper. 
ADJINC:  Adjusted family income is a continuous variable derived 
as follows. The respondent placed total family income in 
one of the following categories: under $15,000, $15,000 
to $25,000, $25,000 to $35,000 or over $35,000. Values 
of  10, 20, 30, and 40 were assigned to each category. 
Sixty of  the respondents did  not  answer the income 
question. An income category was assigned to them on 
the basis of  their reply to a social class question and a 
regression of income on social class. Total family income 
was divided by adult equivalents to create adjusted fami- 
ly income. “Adult equivalents” is the weighted sum of 
the number of  adults and the number of children in the 
household with the following weights: respondent = 1; 
each  additional  adult = .8;  first  child = .5;  second 
child = .4; each additional child = .3. A negative coef- 
ficient was expected  for ADJINC both  because of  a 
possible effect of  income on time preference, and an 
effect of time preference on inc~rne.’~ 
Three alternative OLS specifications (for each sex) allow us to look 
first only at the background variables (controlling for the implicit interest 
rate and expected inflation), then at the effects of  schooling (which is 
probably affected by the family background variables and may be a route 
through which they affect time preference), and finally at the effect of 
family income. The regressions were also estimated in logistic form by 
maximum likelihood; the  results  are similar to those  for  OLS.  The 
coefficients from the logistic version of the third specification, converted 
to marginal effects at the mean probability of taking “now” are shown in 
column (3L). 
In the first specification, AGE and PARED are statistically significant 
for males in the expected direction, while JEW is highly significant for 
females. A coefficient of  -  .22 indicates that, ceteris paribus, a Jewish 
female respondent has .22 lower probability of  answering “now” than 
does a Protestant or other female. The sign of the LIVPAR coefficient is 
opposite to that expected, perhaps because of  sample selection bias. It 105  Time Preference and Health 
may be that most persons from broken homes do have high rates of  time 
discount, but those who “make it” to a middle class suburban community 
are probably atypical and may have low rates of time discount. 
The schooling variables behave as expected for females and are highly 
significant. For males, the 512YRS coefficient is as expected, but the 
rl6YRS  coefficient h2s the wrong sign and is statistically significant. It is 
not obvious why men with 16  years of schooling or more should be, ceteris 
paribus, more eager to take the prize now than men with 13 to 15 years; 
possibly the former have better opportunities to invest the money. 
The income variable works as expected for females and is significant; it 
has the wrong sign for males but is not significant. In the fullest specifica- 
tion, LIVPAR and PARED are statistically significant for females with 
signs opposite to that expected. Some of the background and socioeco- 
nomic variables are highly correlated with one another (see Appendix 
Table 3.A.  1  for the zero order correlation matrix) and multicollinearity 
may explain some of  the perverse results. EXINFL is statistically sig- 
nificant in the expected direction and has approximately the same effect 
as the nominal implicit interest rate on the probability of taking the prize 
now. 
The model underlying the regressions reported in Table 3.3 treats time 
preference  (as reflected in the choice between “now”  and “wait”)  as 
dependent on years of  schooling. As previously discussed, some writers 
believe that differences in time preference are  established early in life and 
are stable. They would treat years of  schooling as dependent on time 
preference. Table 3.4  presents the results of regressions in which years of 
schooling is regressed on time preference and other variables. The new 
variables: 
IMPINT: An implicit interest rate is calculated for each respondent 
who gave consistent answers to the six implicit interest rate questions. 
Those respondents who answered “now” to some questions and “wait” 
to others were assigned a rate equal to the mean of the highest implicit 
rate to which  they  answered  “now”  and the lowest  to which  they 
answered “wait  .”16  Those respondents who always chose to “wait” were 
assigned a rate of 5% and those who always chose “now” were assigned 
60%. The higher  the respondent’s  IMPINT, the lower should be the 
years of  schooling. The variable EXINFL should work in the opposite 
direction. 
HSRANK: The respondent’s  scholastic performance in high school 
was inferred from replies to the question: When you were in high school 
were you (percent of  sample in each category shown in parentheses) 
1) an excellent student (10%) 
2)  an above average student (28%) 
3)  an average student (57%) 
4)  a below average student (5%). Table 3.4  Regression of Years of Schooling on Implicit Interest Rate and Other Variables 
Females (N= 162)"  Males (N= 157)= 
(3)  (3) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  S.E.  (1)  (2)  (3)  S.E. 
AGE  -  .066**  -  .035**  -  .038*  (.016)  -.045*  -.035  -  .043*  (.017) 
EXINFL  -  ,036  -  ,032  -  ,031  (.029)  .104*  .106*  .107**  (.040) 
PARED  .223**  .150**  (.056)  .137  .091  (.074) 
LIVPAR  1.252*  1.025*  (.456)  1.398*  1.299*  (.568) 
JEW  1.276'  1.077*  (.488)  ,899  .730  (.SO) 
HSRANK  .120**  (.021)  .089**  (.027) 
HSHLTH  ,130  (.367)  .lo9  (.403) 
Intercept  17.367  12.116  3.562  (1.951)  15.277  12.505  6.426  (2.351) 
R2  ,128  ,274  .411  ,072  ,273  ,324 
Tonsistent respondents only. 
*p <  .05 
IMPINT  -  ,024"  -  ,019'  -  .014  (.008)  -  ,004  ,003  -  .ooo  (.ow 
CATH  .082  -  ,143  (.357)  -1.346"*  -1.157*  (.4W 
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Grade averages of  95,85,75, and 65 were assigned to the four categories 
respectively, and the variable is treated as a continuous variable. A 
positive coefficient is expected. 
HSHLTH:  Health in high school was treated as a dummy variable 
taking a value of  1  if  the respondent recalled his or her health as being 
“better  than most of  the other kids”  (26%), and 0 if  it was “about 
average” (70%) or “worse than most of the other kids” (4%). A positive 
coefficient is also expected for this variable. 
The results of these regressions again give weak support for the view 
that there is a relation between time preference and schooling, but leave 
open the question of the direction of the causality. In the first specifica- 
tion the coefficient of IMPINT is highly significant for females, and is still 
significant when the family background variables are introduced. EX- 
INFL has the wrong sign and is not significant. For males the reverse is 
true: EXINFL is significant with the expected sign, but IMPINT shows no 
effect. 
The background variables work as expected, with PARED and LIV- 
PAR both raising years of schooling. HSRANK has a very strong effect, 
but  the  causality may  be  partly  the reverse  of  that  assumed in this 
regression, i.e., persons who plan to go on to college may exert more 
effort to do well in high school. HSHLTH shows practically no effect on 
years of schooling. In general, this variable has very low correlations with 
other socioeconomic or health variables, suggesting that it may be poorly 
measured. 
One of  the purposes of the pilot survey was to determine the correla- 
tion among alternative measures of  time preference. These correlation 
coefficients, shown in Table 3.5, indicate a weak but statistically sig- 
nificant correlation between the implicit and explicit interest rates and 
between the implicit rate and replies to the two simple attitudinal ques- 
tions (“spend now” and “don’t worry”). The other two attitudinal ques- 
tions, which are more complex because they introduce considerations 
such as life insurance and the education of children, do not correlate well 
with either the implicit or explicit rates, although they are correlated with 
each other. The fact that the credit card debit and car loan dummy 
variables are not significantly correlated with the interest rate variables 
would be disturbing, but given the timing of  the pilot survey, there may 
be an easy explanation. The interest rates on these loans were legally 
restricted to unrealistically low levels, given the high interest rates pre- 
vailing at that time and given the high rates revealed by the respondents 
in replies to the implicit rate questions. 
Explanations aside, the low correlations across time preference ques- 
tions must be a source of some concern. They suggest the need for further 
refinement in the survey techniques and the need to understand better 
how the specific context of  a decision affects intertemporal choice. Table 3.5  Correlation Coefficients" among Time Preference Variables (N =  329)b 
Implicit  Explicit  Don't  Spend  No life  Don't  Credit  Use car 
interest  interest  sacrifice  now  insurance  worry  card debit  loan 
Implicit interest 
Explicit interest 
Don't  sacrifice' 
Spend nowd 
No life insurance' 
Don't  worry' 
Credit card debit 
Use car loan 
- 
.23** 
.23** 
.14** 
.09 
.06 
-  .01 
-  .06 
.23** 
.03 
.11* 
.08 
-  .03 
.oo 
- 
-  .04 
.oo 
.02 
.09* 
.26** 
.09* 
.07 
.13* 
- 
.23*' 
.ll 
.08 
.02 
.lo* 
.11* 
.04 
- 
-  .06 
-  .04 
.25** 
.03 
-  .05 
-  .08 
-  .01 
.14* 
.08 
.09 
.ll 
.06 
.09* 
.lo* 
- 
.09 
-  .02 
.07 
.ll 
-  .07 
.08 
.19** 
- 
- 
.06 
.oo 
.12* 
.04 
.01 
.09 
.21** 
- 
"Upper right triangle shows simple correlations; lower left triangle shows partial correlations controlling for age and sex. 
'Disagree  with statement in question 35. 
dAgree with statement in question 36. 
"Disagree with statement in question 37. 
'Agree with statement in question 38. 
respondents with consistent answers to implicit interest rate questions. 
*p  <  .05 
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Investment in Health 
Do differences in time preference affect investments in health? Some 
crude measures of these investments were obtained by asking the respon- 
dents about their cigarette smoking, dental visits, exercise, weight (as a 
proxy for diet), and seat belt usage. 
Replies to questions about these behaviors were converted to con- 
tinuous variables as follows: 
SMOKE  Question:  Do  you  currently 
smoke cigarettes?  Assigned 
value 
Replies: 
OVWT 
EXER 
1) No. 
2)  Yes, less than a pack a day. 
3)  Yes, about a pack a day. 
4)  Yes,  more  than  a  pack  a 
Question:  Would  you  say 
that  you  are  cur- 
rently . . . 
day. 
Replies: 
1)  underweight. 
2)  about the right weight. 
3)  about  5-10  pounds  over- 
4)  about  11-20  pounds over- 
5)  more than 20 pounds over- 
Question:  When did you have 
your  last  dental 
checkup? 
weight 
weight. 
weight. 
DENTDEL 
Replies: 
1)  Within the last year. 
2)  About  one  or  two  years 
3)  About  three to five  years 
4) More than five years ago. 
Question:  How often do you 
exercise for 30 min- 
utes or more? 
ago. 
ago. 
Replies: 
1) Never. 
0 
10 
20 
30 
0 
0 
7.5 
15 
30 
0.5 
1.5 
4.0 
8.0 
0 
% of 
sample 
64 
12 
14 
10 
5 
39 
35 
12 
9 
72 
19 
5 
4 
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2) Once a month or less. 
3)  Several times a month. 
4) About once a week. 
5) Two to three times a week. 
6)  More  than  three  times  a 
Question: When you are in a 
car, how  often do 
you use seat belts? 
week. 
STBELT 
Replies: 
1) All the time. 
2) Most of  the time. 
3)  Some of  the time. 
4) Rarely or never. 
1 
2.5 
4 
10 
18 
1  .oo 
.75 
.30 
.05 
9 
9 
10 
16 
16 
21 
7 
13 
59 
The correlation between  favorable health behaviors is positive for 
every possible pair (reversing signs where appropriate), but the coef- 
ficients are quite low and only some are statistically significant (see Table 
3.6). The correlations with seat belt usage suggest that individual differ- 
ences with respect to health in  general may be more important than 
differences in time preference. Moreover, the generally low correlations 
underscore the fact that even if  there is a common factor at work across 
behaviors,  there are also other factors that  are specific to particular 
behaviors. The low coefficients may also be attributable to the rough 
approximations used to measure the variables. 
In order to test for possible effects of  time preference, the health 
behavior variables were regressed on IMPINT, EXINFL, and several 
other variables. The results for cigarette smoking are reported in Table 
3.7. They confirm the expectation that cigarette smoking does increase 
Table 3.6  Correlation Coefficients’  among Health-related Behavior Variables 
(N =  508) 
SMOKE  OVWT  DENTDEL  EXER  STBELT 
SMOKE  -  .01  .06  -  .08  -  .12** 
OVWT  .O1  -  .06  -  .18**  -  .12** 
DENTDEL  .05  .06  -  .01  -  .07 
EXER  -  .08*  -.17**  -.01  -  .09* 
STBELT  -  .12**  -  .12**  -  .08*  .09*  - 
- 
~~  ~ 
“Upper right triangle shows simple correlations; lower left triangle shows partial 
correlations,  controlling for age and sex. 
*p<  .05 
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with higher IMPINT, and decrease with higher EXINFL, but the size of 
the effect of IMPINT is quite small. We also see an effect of schooling on 
cigarette smoking as expected; the difference between the coefficients  for 
512YRS and 216YRS is statistically significant for males. The overall 
explanatory power of  the regression is low; most of  the variation in 
cigarette smoking is not explained by these variables and the addition of 
ADJINC was of  little value. 
Regressions for the other health behaviors were even less statisfactory. 
The total explanatory power was low, and IMPINT was not statistically 
significant except for EXER for males, where the sign was the opposite of 
that expected. 
Health Status 
In the first section of  this paper questions were raised about whether 
difference in time preference could help explain health status or throw 
light on the relation  between  health status and schooling. Table 3.8 
reports the results of  regressions addressed to these questions. Part A 
uses as the dependent variable LnHLTH, the same variable used by 
Grossman (1975) in “The Correlation between Health and Schooling.” It 
is obtained by  taking the logarithms of  values given to replies to the 
question: In general, would you consider your health to be . . . 
Assigned value  % of  sample 
1) Excellent  1.0  43 
2)  Good  9.8  45 
3)  Fair  26.4  9 
4)  Poor  86.7  3 
Grossman obtained these values from a regression of  work-loss weeks 
due to illness on self-evaluation of  health status.” 
The results support Grossman’s finding of  a strong effect of schooling 
on health and it appears that the effect is equally strong for females and 
males.’*  The coefficients  for IMPINT have the expected negative sign, but 
are not statistically significant. When time preference and schooling are 
entered simultaneously, the latter clearly dominates the former. When 
ADJINC is added to the regression, its coefficient is not significant, and 
the other results are unchanged. 
Three other sets of health status questions were asked in addition to the 
subjective self-evaluation.  One used a checklist of  symptoms and di- 
agnoses;  a  second requested  information  on utilization of  hospitals, 
drugs, and physicians’ services; and the third asked about the respon- 
dent’s ability to walk or jog a mile. These measures are significantly 
correlated with each other and with self-evaluation of health status, even 
after controlling for age  and  sex  (partial  correlation  coefficients are Table 3.7  Regression of Number of Cigarettes Smoked Per Day on Socioeconomic Variables 
Females (N = 162)"  Males (N = 157)a 
(2)  (3)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (3) 
Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E. 
(1) 
AGE 
IMPINT 
EXINFL 
PARED 
LIVPAR 
CAW 
JEW 
5  12YRS 
2  16YRS 
Intercept 
R2 
Dependent variable mean 
Dependent variable standard deviation 
-  ,041  -  ,075 
.072*  .074* 
-  .280*  -  .297* 
-  ,376 
,117 
,092 
-2.325 
8.606  15.284 
.043  ,067 
-  ,081 
.063 
-  .292* 
-  .313 
-  .049 
-2.604 
1.012 
-  2.089 
-  5.568* * 
17.595 
,110 
(.076) 
(.036) 
(.136) 
(.268) 
(2.139) 
(1.658) 
(2.300) 
(1.814) 
(2.045) 
(6.097) 
6.42 
9.43 
,018  .037 
.092*  .098* 
-  ,263  -  .275 
,234 
-2.887 
-  ,617 
-1.224 
5.759  5.577 
.043  .054 
.025 
.091* 
.403 
-  ,155 
-  1.326 
-  1.647 
-  ,758 
5.325* 
-  .853 
1.102 
,108 
(.080) 
(.337) 
(.043) 
(.186) 
(2.664) 
(2.136) 
(2.537) 
(2.315) 
(2.207) 
(7.018) 
6.82 
10.68 
"Only respondents with consistent answers to implicit interest rate questions. 
*p< .05 
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typically about .20). A composite health status variable MNEXHLTH 
was calculated from the four measures by  assigning a value of  .25 to 
respondents for each of  the following: 
1) Self-evaluation excellent (44%) 
2)  Zero symptoms (47%) 
3)  Very low medical care utili~ation’~  (64%) 
4)  Able to jog a mile (61%) 
This “mean proportion of excellent health measures” is the dependent 
variable in the regressions reported in Part B of Table 3.8.  They indicate a 
stronger effect for time preference  and a relatively weaker effect for 
schooling.20  IMPINT actually achieves statistical significance for males. It 
appears that the choice of  health status measure makes a difference. 
Unresolved Questions 
This exploratory study leaves unresolved many empirical and theo- 
retical questions concerning time preference, health behavior, and health 
status. The attempt to measure implicit interest rates through a series of 
six  dichotomous choices between  “money  now”  and  “money  in  the 
future” produced answers that are clearly not all “noise,” but neither are 
they completely satisfactory. About one-third of  the respondents had at 
least  one inconsistent  reply.  Moreover,  one-half of  those  who were 
consistent answered all the questions the same way (either all “now” or 
all “wait”). An extension of the range of the implicit interest rates might 
yield more information about this group. An increase in the number of 
questions would be desirable for many reasons, but the directors of  the 
survey believe that six is about all the respondents will tolerate as part of 
the total telephone interview. 
At a time of  sharply rising prices,  the measurement  of  “real” vs. 
“nominal” interest rates presents a major problem which is solved only 
partially by  including a question on expected inflation. The EXINFL 
variable usually works as expected-pposite  to IMPINT-but  the coef- 
ficients are not always equal, and sometimes the signs are inconsistent. 
The mean implicit interest rate in this survey of  30%  per annum is 
substantially lower than the rates reported in surveys by other investiga- 
tors. This rate is still high, however, compared to current borrowing and 
lending rates, and high compared to the mean response to the explicit 
interest rate question (14%). Why the difference? Also, although the 
implicit and explicit rates are significantly correlated (r  = .23 for the 
two-thirds of the sample with consistent replies), why isn’t the correlation 
higher? 
The pilot survey confirms our a priori expectation of  a correlation 
between  schooling and time preference,  but other types of  data are 
needed if  we are to learn something about the direction of the causality. Table 3.8  Regressions of Health Status.  on Time Preference, Schooling, and Age 
Females  Males 
IMPINT  EXINFL  SCHOOL  AGE  R2  IMPINT  EXINFL  SCHOOL  AGE  R2 
Part A 
LnHLTH 
(1) 
(3) 
-  ,003  -  .004 
(.003)  (.012) 
.059* 
(.025) 
-  ,002  -  .001  .054* 
(.03)  (.011  (.026) 
Part B 
MNEXHLTH 
-  .001  ,001 
-  .015*  .045  -  .003  ,018 
(.ow  (.003)  (.015) 
-  ,010  ,069 
-  .011  .072  -  .003  .013 
(.004)  (.016) 
-.007**  ,062  -  .002*  ,001 
-.006**  ,071 
-.006**  ,072  -  .002*  .001 
(.002)  (.001)  (.005) 
.059* 
(.027) 
,054 
(.028) 
.009 
(.008) 
,009 
(.001)  (.005)  (.010)  (.001)  (.005) 
"For definitions and measurement of  health status variables, see text. 
*p  <  .05 
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The effect of time preference on health behavior and on health status is 
usually in the expected direction, but is not always statistically significant, 
and even when statistically significant the size of  the effect is frequently 
small. This may be partly the result of  errors in the measurement of time 
preference  but  may  also  indicate  weaknesses  in  specification  of  the 
model. 
For instance, the assumption that investment behavior is affected only 
by time preference is probably unrealistic. Investments typically involve 
uncertainty  as well  as time preference  because  future  values of  any 
variable, whether the price of  a stock or the state of  health, cannot be 
known with certainty. Thus, individual attitudes toward  risk will also 
affect investment behavior. The uncertainty element is probably particu- 
larly large in the case of  investments in health such as  giving up cigarettes, 
eliminating fatty foods, jogging, and the like. Even the best information 
available indicates only the average expected benefit from such health 
investments; the return to any individual is highly uncertain. Only a 
minority of  cigarette smokers will actually contract lung cancer, while 
giving up cigarette smoking does not provide a guarantee against the 
disease. Therefore, individual differences with respect to uncertainty can 
also affect health investment and health status. 
Psychologists  Kahneman  and Tversky, in their highly original and 
provocative work on prospect theory (1979), have suggested that most 
individuals prefer certain to uncertain gains,  but prefer uncertainty to 
certainty with  respect to losses. For example, most individuals, when 
offered a choice between A) a certain gain of  $500 or B) an equal chance 
to win $1,000 or nothing, will choose A. The same individuals, when 
offered a choice between A) a certain loss of $500 or B) an equal chance 
to lose $1,000 or nothing, will choose B. 
Such asymmetry in risk aversion, if  applicable to health-related be- 
havior, could be important. Consider a person contemplating giving up 
some current pleasurable activity or undertaking an unpleasant one in 
return for the chance of an improvement in health status sometime in the 
future. The immediate  action  involves  a  loss with  a  high  degree  of 
certainty, but the future gain is quite uncertain for the individual even 
though it may be highly predictable, on average, for a large population. 
Thus, the stronger the individual’s asymmetry with respect to uncertainty 
(as described by Kahneman and Tversky), the less likely will he or she be 
to undertake the health-enhancing action. This conclusion is unaltered if 
one reverses the framing of  the decision and thinks of the current activity 
such as cigarette smoking as a “gain” (where certainty is preferred) and 
the possibility of  ill health in the future as the “loss.”  Thus, individual 
differences in  risk  aversion may confound attempts to measure time 
preference or to analyze the effects of time preference on health. 116  Victor R. Fuchs 
This survey and the analyses reported here also highlight problems of 
measurement of  health status and health investment. When health is 
measured by subjective self-evaluation, the results are different from 
those that are obtained when  a composite health  measure based  on 
self-evaluation, medical care utilization, symptoms, and physical ability 
is used. Problems in the measurement of health investment surface when 
we examine a variable like exercise; it seems that exercise is undertaken 
for many reasons other than to improve health. These other reasons may 
swamp an effect of  time preference. Perhaps more detailed questions 
concerning the type and intensity of  exercise would help. 
I conclude this report of  exploratory research on a note of  cautious 
optimism. Crude but useful measures of  time preference, health invest- 
ment, and health status can be obtained, even through very inexpensive 
telephone interviews. Time preference is  related to schooling, and also 
shows some relation to health investment and health status. However, 
none of  the relationships found in these data are particularly strong. 
Whether improvements in survey design, more accurate measurement of 
variables, and better specification  of models will produce more significant 
results remains to be determined. 
Appendix 
Table 3.A.1  Zero-order Correlations among Selected Variables 
SCHOOL HSRANK  PARED  LIVPAR  ADJINC  IMPINT  EXINFL 
SCHOOL  -  .47  .37  .21  .25  -.23  -.05 
HSRANK  .33  -  .21  .09  .15  -.11  -.03 
PARED  .30  .19  -  .02  .29  -.07  .01 
LIVPAR  .20  .10  .15  -  .07  .02  .02 
ADJINC  .27  .09  .14  -.04  -  -  .23  .01 
.19  IMPINT  -.03  .03  -  .21  .02  -.02  - 
EXINFL  .18  -.01  .03  -.05  -.06  .03  - 
Females: upper right triangle. 
Males:  lower left triangele. 
rz  I  .21 Ip< .01 
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Time Preference Questions 
A. Implicit interest rate 
Given your present circumstances, suppose you won a tax-free 
prize at a local bank and were offered a choice between two 
prizes. I am going to read off pairs of choices and for each pair 
you tell me which prize you would choose. 
2 = $4,000 in 5 years 
2 = $2,500 in 3 years 
2 = $6,000 in  4 years 
2 = $1,250 in 1 year 
2 = $4,000 in 3 years 
2 = $2,500 in  4 years 
28.1 = $1,500 now, or 
29. 1  = $1,000 now, or 
30.1 = $4,000 now, or 
31. 1  = $750 now, or 
32. 1  = $2,500 now, or 
33.1 = $500 now, or 
DON’T [3 = don’t know 
READ  [9 = refuse 
DON’T [3 = don’t know 
READ  [9 = refuse 
DON’T [3 = don’t know 
READ  [9 = refuse 
DON’T [3 = don’t know 
READ  [9 = refuse 
DON’T [3 = don’t know 
READ  [9 = refuse 
DON’T [3 = don’t know 
READ  [9 = refuse 
B. Explicit interest rate 
34. Suppose you won a tax-free prize of  $10,000 at a local bank. 
You then had a choice between getting the money now or 
leaving it in the bank for one year. How much interest would 
the bank have to pay you in order for you to agree to leave the 
money  in  the  bank?  [CASCADE-STOP  READING 
WHEN CHOICE MENTIONED] 
1=6%  6 = 30% 
2=8%  7 = 50% 
3 = 10% 
now 
4=  15% 
5 = 20%  READ  or refuse 
8 = take the money 
DON’T [9 = don’t know 
C. Additudinal questions 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
(Categories for Questions 35 to 38) 
1  = agree  2 = disagree  DON’T [3 = don’t know 
READ  [9 = refuse 
35. Parents  should  make  financial  sacrifices in  order  to  save 
money for their children’s education. 
- 
28 
29 
- 
30 
31 
32 
- 
33 
- 
34 
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36. It makes more sense to spend your money now rather than 
saving it for the future. 
37. A working man should have life insurance equivalent to at 
least three times his annual income even if  paying for this 
insurance means he would have to live on a tight budget. 
38. Most people spend too much time worrying about the future 
and not enough time enjoying themselves today. 
- 
36 
- 
37 
- 
38 
D. Expected inflation 
39. In general, during the coming year do you expect prices to: 
1 = decrease 
2 = stay about the same 
3 = increase by about 5 percent 
4  = increase by about 10 percent 
5 = increase by about 15 percent 
6 = increase by about 20 percent 
7 = increase by about 30 percent or more 
DON’T [8 = don’t know 
READ [9 = refuse 
- 
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E.  Use of  credit 
54. At the end of each month do  you usually pay the balance on all 
your outstanding credit cards, or do you have a debit balance 
on which you must pay interest? 
1  = pay all balances 
3 = have no credit cards 
car loan? 
DON’T [9 = don’t know  - 
2 = have debit balance  READ  or refuse  54 
55. When you or your spouse buy a car, do you pay cash or take a 
[9 = refuse  1  = pay cash 
2 = take a car loan 
3 = have done both in 
4  = never buy cars 
the past 
Notes 
- 
55 
1. For an excellent summary of present knowledge in this field as well as many useful 
bibliographies, see Healthy People, The Surgeon General’s Report on Health Promotion and 
Dbease Prevention,  Background Papers, U.S. Department on  Health, Education, and 
Welfare (PHS) No.  79-55071A, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979. 119  Time Preference and Health 
2.  There are, to be sure, many other possible explanations for this correlation.  For 
instance,  persons  with  better  health  endowments  may  be more efficient in  schooling 
activities,  or their expected rate of  return  to schooling may be higher because of  their 
greater life expectancy.  Conversely, the rate of  return to investment in health may be 
greater for those who have had more schooling. 
3. “When habits are once formed, they regulate the tenor of the future life, and make 
slaves of  their former masters.” John Rae, The Sociological Theory of  Capital, ed. C. W. 
Mixtor (1834; reprint ed., New York: Macmillan, 1905) as quoted in Shlomo and Sharona 
Maital (1978). 
4. William Hazlitt wrote in TheRound Table (1817), “Persons without education. . .  see 
their objects always near, and never in the horizon.”  And Robert Penn Warren  wrote 
“Without  the fact of  the past, we cannot dream the future.” (“Brother to Dragons,”  a 
poem.) 
5. I am grateful to Alan Garber and Richard Zeckhauser for helpful comments on this 
point. 
6. Temporal orientation refers to the point in time around which a person’s thoughts 
center and to the volume of  those thoughts. 
7. The questionnaire was administered by psychologists at Perceptronics in Eugene, 
Oregon. 
8.  Stephen Cole also made many contributions to the design of the questionnaire. 
9.  A digit-raising technique was used to insure inclusion of  unlisted numbers. 
10. See Appendix A for a list of time preference questions. 
11. I am grateful to Amos Tversky for advice on this point. 
12. Approximately one-quarter of  the respondents classified as consistent chose “now” 
for all six questions and another one-quarter always chose to wait. Their replies, while not 
inconsistent, are not as informative about consistency as the replies of those respondents 
who chose “now” for some questions and “wait” for others. 
13.  Given six questions,  every possible set of  replies can be made consistent with a 
maximum of three reversals. 
14. This hypothesis was suggested by Phillip Farrell. 
15. Ceterk parihus, individuals with low rates of  time discount might accumulate more 
savings, might choose occupations with larger on-the-job investment opportunities,  etc. 
16. For example, a respondent who answered “now” to the first four questions in Table 
3.1 and “wait” to the next two was assigned a rate of  35.35%. 
17. A  different set of  values,  based on a regression  with a different sample, yielded 
almost identical results to those reported here. 
18. Grossman’s regression (for middle-aged males) comparable to Regression 2 in Table 
38, Part A, had a coefficient of  .035 for schooling and -  .017 for age. 
19. No hospitalization  in past  year,  no prescription  drugs in past week,  no medical 
condition requiring regular visits to  physician, and fewer than three visits to  physician in past 
six months. To be sure, medical care utilization may reflect factors such as income and 
insurance coverage as well as health status. 
20.  The weak effect of  schooling is attributable to the “symptoms”  and “utilization” 
measures of  health status. When these measures are used as dummy dependent variables in 
regressions equivalent to (3) in Table 3.8, schooling is negatively (albeit not significantly) 
related to good health. 
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